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ABSTRACT
This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. executive pay during the
period 1993-2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be
explained by changes in firm size, performance and industry classification. Had the relationship of
compensation to size, performance and industry classification remained the same in 2003 as it was
in 1993, mean compensation in 2003 would have been only about half of its actual size. During the
1993-2003 period, equity-based compensation has increased considerably in both new economy and
old economy firms, but this growth has not been accompanied by a substitution effect, i.e., a
reduction in non-equity compensation. The aggregate compensation paid by public companies to
their top-five executives during the considered period added up to about $350 billion, and the ratio
of this aggregate top-five compensation to the aggregate earnings of these firms increased from 5%
in 1993-1995 to about 10% in 2001-2003. After presenting evidence about the growth of pay, we
discuss alternative explanations for it. We examine how this growth could be explained under either
the arm's length bargaining model of executive compensation or the managerial power model.
Among other things, we discuss the relevance of the parallel rise in market capitalizations and in the















The growth in executive pay over the past decade has increased the attention given to the 
subject of executive compensation. There is now a heated debate about the quality of the pay 
setting process in publicly traded companies and the compensation arrangements that it produces 
(see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004), Hall and Murphy (2003), Jensen, Murphy, and 
Wruck (2004)). This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing assessment of the executive pay 
landscape by examining, both empirically and theoretically, the growth of pay during the period 
1993-2003. 
Section II begins by describing the growth in pay during the considered period and then 
proceeds to examine the extent to which the pay growth can be explained by changes in firm 
size, performance and industry mix. We find that compensation has grown by far more than 
could be explained by such changes. Had the relation of compensation to these attributes 
remained the same, mean compensation in 2003 would have been only about half of its actual 
size. During the period under investigation, the relation between pay and firm size and 
performance has changed, with pay at the end of the period being considerably higher for 
companies of a given size, performance and industry classification.  
Section III examines the growth of equity-based compensation during 1993-2003. The 
fraction of equity-based compensation has grown across the board—in large firms, mid-size 
firms and small firms, as well as in both new economy and old economy firms. Although the 
fraction of non-equity (cash) compensation to total compensation has declined during this period, 
the amounts spent on cash compensation have not declined but rather increased. Furthermore, 
cash compensation has grown somewhat more than could be explained by the changes in size, 
performance and industry mix during the considered period.    
Section IV examines the changes in the economic significance of executive pay.  We find 
that executive pay has been economically meaningful.  The aggregate compensation paid by 
public firms to top-five executives during the period 1993-2003 added up to about $350 billion.  
This aggregate top-five compensation accounted for 6.6% of the aggregate earnings (net income) 
of these firms during the period under consideration.  Furthermore, the economic significance of 
executive pay has increased during this period.  The aggregate compensation paid by public 
firms to their top-five executives was 9.8% of the aggregate earnings of these firms during 2001-
2003, up from 5% during 1993-1995.    2
   Section V discusses how the growth of executive pay could be explained. We discuss 
this question both from the perspective of the arm’s length bargaining model of executive 
compensation and from the perspective of the managerial power model. We discuss and evaluate 
alternative explanations. We do not find that, by itself, the increase in executive pay levels can 
resolve the debate on the extent to which executive pay is shaped by managers’ influence on 
boards. Our findings, however, highlight the importance of this debate.  
 
II. THE GROWTH OF PAY  
 
A. The Large Increase in Pay Levels  
 
We use compensation information from the standard ExecuComp database, which includes 
information about executive compensation in public U.S. companies from 1993 onwards. The 
dataset includes all the S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 companies. Together, these 
firms (also known as the S&P 1500) constitute more than 80% of the total market capitalization 
of U.S. public firms. We report below findings on the period 1993-2003, because 2003 was the 
last year for which there was compensation information about the lion’s share of companies in 
the dataset.  
Throughout our analysis, we define as annual compensation the (grant-date) value of the 
compensation package in the year in which it was given. In particular, following a standard 
definition of the total grant-date value of annual compensation reported in the ExecuComp 
database, we define an executive’s total compensation in a given year as the sum of the 
executive’s salary, bonuses, long-term incentive plans, the grant-date value of restricted stock 
awards and the (grant-date) Black-Scholes value of granted options. To adjust for inflation, we 
translate all monetary figures to 2002 dollars.  
It is worth noting that the ExecuComp database does not include information about the value 
of executives’ pension plans because firms are not required to place and disclose a dollar value 
for these plans.  As a result, research on executive pay has largely ignored the value of such 
plans (and the annual increase in their value).  There is evidence, however, that the value of 
pension plans commonly comprises a major component of executives’ compensation (Bebchuk 
and Jackson, 2005).  Thus, like much of the literature, the annual compensation figures we use 
do not include a significant source of additional compensation for many executives.  3
In the early 1990's, some observers viewed executive compensation as quite high (see, e.g., 
Crystal (1991)). Since then, however, compensation levels have climbed considerably. Table 1 
displays the mean compensation levels of the CEO and of the top-five executives during 1993-
2003. Among S&P 500 firms, average CEO compensation climbed from $3.7 million in 1993 to 
$9.1 million in 2003 (an increase of 146%), and average compensation to top-five executives 
increased from $9.5 million in 1993 to $21.4 million in 2003 (an increase of 125%). We observe 
similar upward trends in both CEO pay and top-five executive pay among Mid-Cap firms and 
Small-Cap firms.  
The magnitude of the increase was somewhat higher in S&P 500 firms than in Mid-Cap and 
Small-Cap firms. Also, across the three size groups, the magnitude of the increase was somewhat 
higher for the CEO than for the top-five executives. As a result, CEO pay constituted a higher 
fraction of total top-five executive pay by the end of the examined period than in the beginning.  
 
TABLE 1: MEAN COMPENSATION LEVELS 1993-2003 
The table displays mean compensation levels for CEOs and top-five executives in firms that belong to the S&P 500, 
Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 indexes. All figures are adjusted for inflation and are in 2002 dollars. 
Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total 
value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long term incentive payouts and other compensation. Top-five 
compensation is the sum of the five largest compensation packages that the firm gives to its managers in a given 
year. 
 
CEO Top five executives
Year S&P500 MidCap400 SmallCap600 S&P500 MidCap400 SmallCap600
($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($M)
1993             3.7                2.2                1.3 9.5           5.8                   3.2               
1994             4.4                2.6                1.6 10.7         6.4                   3.9               
1995             4.8                2.9                1.5 11.9         6.8                   4.0               
1996             7.0                3.3                1.9 15.8         8.1                   5.0               
1997             9.1                4.2                2.2 20.0         9.9                   5.4               
1998           10.7                4.6                2.4 23.7         10.4                 5.6               
1999           12.7                5.1                2.3 28.3         11.4                 5.7               
2000           17.4                5.1                2.5 36.6         12.1                 5.9               
2001           14.3                4.7                2.6 31.9         10.6                 5.7               
2002           10.3                4.7                2.2 23.5         10.3                 5.2               
2003             9.1                4.0                2.0 21.4         9.4                   4.7               
  
Figure 1 graphically displays the increase (relative to the beginning of the period under 
consideration) in the rolling three-year average of compensation levels of CEOs and top-five 
executives during the considered period. The rolling average of a firm’s compensation level in  4
any given year is defined as the average of its compensation level in that year and the preceding 
two years. As the figure indicates, the rolling average of compensation levels of both CEOs and 
top-five executives has been increasing steadily. There is a slight drop in 2002 and 2003, but the 
levels stay quite high relative to the beginning of the examined period.  
 
FIGURE 1: CHANGES IN ROLLING AVERAGE OF  
CEO AND TOP-FIVE COMPENSATION: 1993-2003 
 
The figure displays the changes in rolling average compensation among firms that belong to the S&P 500, Mid-Cap 
400 and Small-Cap 600 indexes. For each firm, the firm-level compensation is defined as the average of the 
compensation in the year under consideration and the preceding two years. The firm-level compensation is then 
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B. Can the Growth in Pay be Explained by Changes in Firm Variables? 
 
Compensation levels can be expected to increase with firm size and performance, and to vary 
across industries. It is therefore important to understand to what extent the rise in compensation 
levels during the period under consideration is simply a product of the changes in firm size, 
performance and industry mix during this period.  
  Between 1993 and 2003, firm size increased considerably.  The average size of the S&P 
500 firms, as measured by sales, increased by 40% (inflation-adjusted) from 1993-1995 to 2001-
2003.  During the same period, the average size of the Mid-Cap 400 firms increased by 30% and 
the average size of the Small-Cap 600 firms increased by 51%. Furthermore, during the 
considered period, the incidence of new economy firms, where compensation has been somewhat 
higher, has increased. These changes in size and industry classification might account for some 
of the growth in compensation figures. 
Our next step is therefore to analyze the extent to which compensation levels changed during 
the examined period after controlling for changes in firm characteristics. To this end, we first 
estimate the following regression for firms in our panel:  
 
ROA denotes the ratio of operating income to book value of assets, Returni,t is the market 
return of the firm j’s stock in year t, and fi are firm fixed effects. Following the literature (e.g., 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999)), we use sales to control for size and we use ROA and past 
returns to control for performance. The year dummies indicate how much, holding firm attributes 
fixed, log compensation went up relative to 1993. We ran one regression using CEO pay as the 
dependent variable and one regression using top-five compensation as the dependent variable. 
Table 2 below displays the results of these regressions. As the results indicate, compensation 
levels increased far beyond what can be attributed to changes in firm size and performance. The 
year dummy variables monotonically increase until 2000, decline in 2001, and then continue 
going up in 2002 and 2003, reaching their peak level in 2003. The second column of Table 2 
indicates that the results are similar when we regress top-five compensation on firm 
characteristics using firm fixed effects. The year dummy variables in this regression steadily 
increase until 2000, decline in 2001 and 2002, and climb to their peak level in 2003.  
t i i t i t i
t i t i t i
f dummies Year turn R Log a turn R Log a
ROA Log a sales Log a a on compensati Log
, 2 , 4 1 , 3
1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
) 2003 1994 ( ) e 1 ( ) e 1 (
) 1 ( ) ( ) (
ε + + − + + + +
+ + + + =
− −
− −  
(1)  6
TABLE 2: GROWTH UNEXPLAINED BY SIZE AND PERFORMANCE: 
FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSION 
The sample includes all S&P 1500 firms from the Execucomp database. ROA is the income before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization in year t-1, divided by the book value of asset in year t-1. Firm return is the firm’s 
stock return. All data used are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2002 dollars.  Standard errors appear below the 
coefficient estimate, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
              Dependent variable:                        Dependent variable:  
    Log(Total CEO compensation)          Log(Total Top-5 compensation)
                   
Log(Sales (t-1))    0.138***    0.171 *** 
   (0.014)   (0.009)  
Log(1+Firm ROA (t-1))    0.110*    0.108  
   (0.062)   (0.007)  
Log(1+Firm return )    0.128***    0.024 *** 
   (0.012)   (0.007)  
Log(1+Firm return (t-2))   0.016    0.015  
   (0.012)   (0.043)  
1994   0.059***    0.058  *** 
   (0.022)   (0.014)  
1995   0.132***    0.123  *** 
   (0.022)   (0.014)  
1996   0.147***    0.127  *** 
   (0.023)   (0.015)  
1997   0.239***    0.207  *** 
   (0.023)   (0.015)  
1998   0.228***    0.202  *** 
   (0.024)   (0.015)  
1999   0.288***    0.261  *** 
   (0.024)   (0.015)  
2000   0.316***    0.300  *** 
   (0.025)   (0.016)  
2001   0.245***    0.212  *** 
   (0.025)   (0.016)  
2002   0.352***    0.283  *** 
   (0.026)   (0.016)  
2003   0.450***    0.370  *** 
      (0.026)      (0.017)   
Observations   15397   14154   
Adjusted R
2   56%    74%   
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We can translate the increases in log compensation reflected in the year dummies into 
increases in compensation by taking the exponent of the estimated coefficients. Figure 2 plots the 
increases in compensation associated with this transformation. As the Figure indicates, 
controlling for firm size and performance (i.e., for a firm with the same size and performance), 
the levels of the CEO compensation increased by 96% between 1993 and 2003, and the levels of 
the top-five executives increased by 76%. The Figure also shows an almost monotonic increase 
in CEO and top five compensation throughout the years. 
 
FIGURE 2: INCREASE IN COMPENSATION AFTER CONTROLLING FOR SIZE, 
PERFORMANCE AND FIXED EFFECTS 
The figure displays the changes in compensation to CEOs and top-five executives among firms that belong to the 
ExecuComp database after controlling for size, performance and fixed-effects. The year 1993 is the reference point 
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To get a better sense of the proportion of the unexplained increase, we re-ran regression (1) 
using only firms that existed throughout the period. Average CEO compensation in these firms 
was increased from 1993 to 2003 by 166 per cent. The coefficient in 2003 of the fixed effect 
regression is 0.69, suggesting that the increase in compensation unexplained by changes in size 
and performance was 100%. This implies that changes in firm size and performance can explain 
only 66 per cent of the total 166 per cent increase, or about 40 per cent of the total increase, with 
60 per cent of the total increase remaining unexplained.  
Doing similar calculations for the top-five executives in firms that existed throughout the 
considered period, we find that top-five compensation increased on average by 98%, and that, 
controlling for firm size and performance, compensation increased by 78%. Thus, changes in 
size and performance can account only for about 20% of the actual increase in top-five pay, 
leaving 80% of the actual increase unexplained by such changes.  
Thus far we have focused on panel regressions with firm fixed effects and thus on the set of 
firms that appear in our data in different years.  Another way to identify the increase in 
compensation unexplained by changes in firm variables is to compare actual 2003 compensation 
levels with those that would have existed if the relation between compensation and firm variables 
had remained the same as in 1993.  We ran the following regression to identify how 1993 
compensation depended on firm characteristics: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i
INDUSTRY ECONOMY NEW RET STD a turn Log a
turn Log a ROA Log a sales Log a a on compensati Log
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 5 2 , 4
1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
_ _ ) Re 1 (
) Re 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
ε + + + + + +
+ + + + + =
− − − −
− − −  
(2) 
 
In this regression, we add to the controls we used in the fixed firm effects regression some 
firm characteristics that might explain cross-sectional variation in compensation. In particular, 
we add a new economy dummy, which takes a value of 1 for new economy firms and 0 
otherwise, and industry dummies. In classifying firms as new economy firms, we use throughout 
the definition of Murphy (2003), and we use 48 industry dummies classified by Fama and French 
(1997).
1 Following prior empirical and theoretical work (e.g., Cyert et al., 2002, Core et al., 
1999, Aggarwal and Samwick 1999), we also add a measure of firm risk, using the standard 
                                                 
1 Murphy (2003) defines new economy firms as firms who belong to the following industry groups: 
producers of computer and office equipment and computer wholesales (SIC codes 3570, 3571, 3572, 
3576, 5045), Telecom.  Companies (SIC codes 3661, 4812, 4813), producers of semiconductor and 
related devices (SIC code 3674), mail order/internet (SIC code 5961), and software companies (SIC codes 
7370, 7371, 7372, 7373).  9
deviation of the firm’s monthly returns in the 48 months prior to the compensation year. 
Regressions such as (2) are widely used in the literature in capturing the effect of size, 
performance and risk on managerial compensation. We ran one regression using CEO pay as the 
dependent variable and one regression using top-five compensation as the dependent variable.  
We then forecast the compensation levels that firms existing in 2003 would have had using 
the coefficients from the 1993 regression – that is, we estimate what 2003 compensation levels 
would have been assuming that the relation of pay to firm characteristics would have been the 
same in 2003 as in 1993. Table 3 displays the results of our calculations.  
 
TABLE 3: PAY GROWTH UNEXPLAINED BY CHANGES IN SIZE, PERFORMANCE 
AND INDUSTRY MIX 
 
The table compares actual 2003 compensation levels with those that would exist if the relationship between 
compensation, firm size, and industry remained the same as in 1993. For each firm we predict the average 
compensation in 2003 with the coefficients of the cross-sectional regression run over the year 1993. We use the 
regression specification in equation (2):  
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
INDUSTRY ECONOMY NEW RET STD a
turn Log a turn Log a ROA Log a sales Log a a on compensati Log
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 5
2 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
_ _
) Re 1 ( ) Re 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
ε + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
− − −
− − − −  
All figures used are translated to 2002 dollars.  Standard errors appear below the coefficient estimate, and *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
                      CEO  Top five 
Mean compensation 2003 ($M)    4.9   11.8 
Predicted compensation based on the 1993 regression results ($M)  2.1   6.0 
Mean difference between predicted and actual compensation ($M)  2.8 ***  5.8*** 
Mean actual compensation as a percentage of predicted   215% ***  179%*** 
                   
 
As Table 3 indicates, compensation levels in 2003 were much higher than they would have 
been had the relation of compensation to firm size, performance and industry remained the same 
as in 1993. The 2003 CEO levels exceeded by 115% the levels predicted by the 1993 regression, 
and the top-five compensation levels exceeded by 79% the levels predicted by the 1993 
regression. These increases are statistically significant at the 1% level. We thus conclude that the 




III. THE GROWTH OF EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION 
 
One source of the increase in compensation documented in the previous section is the 
increase in equity-based compensation. Equity-based compensation is comprised of the options 
and the restricted stock that top executives commonly receive as part of their compensation.  In 
this section we examine separately the growth of the equity-based portion and the non-equity 
based portion of CEO and top-five executive compensation.  
Table 4 shows the increase in the fraction of total compensation made by equity-based 
compensation in all types of firms. Whereas equity-based compensation was 37% of the total 
compensation to top-five executives of the S&P 500 firms in 1993, its fraction of total 
compensation increased to 55% by 2003. The fraction of total top-five compensation made in 
equity-based compensation increased from 41% to 51% for Mid-Cap companies and from 34% 
to 41% for Small-Cap companies. We observe a similar trend in CEO compensation.  
Table 4 also shows that the fraction of compensation made in equity was higher 
throughout the period for new economy firms than for other firms. However, the increased use of 
equity-based compensation was not merely due to the increase in the incidence of new economy 
firms. The use of equity based compensation increased in both new-economy firms and firms not 
classified as new economy.  The fraction of total top-five compensation made in equity increased 
from 50% in 1993 to 69% in 2003 for new economy firms, and increased from 36% in 1993 to 
50% in 2003 for other firms. Again, the trend in the composition of CEO compensation is 
similar. 
It is worth noting that the fraction of equity-based compensation “peaked” in 2000-2001 
and declined considerably afterwards. From 2001 to 2003, the fraction of top-five compensation 
based on equity decreased from 72% to 55% for S&P 500 companies, from 60% to 52% for Mid-
Cap companies and from 52% to 41% for Small-Cap companies. We observe a similar trend in 
both new economy firms and other firms, as well as in CEO compensation in all types of firms. 
However, with respect to both top-five compensation and CEO compensation, and in all 
categories of firms, the fraction of 2003 compensation that was equity-based was still 





TABLE 4: EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION 
The table displays the percentage of equity-based compensation out of the aggregate total compensation for CEOs 
and top-five executives in firms that belong to the S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 indexes. Equity-based 
compensation is defined as the total value of restricted stock granted and total value of stock options granted (using 
Black-Scholes). Top-five executive compensation is the sum of the five largest compensation packages that a firm 
gives to its managers in a given year.  
 





 as New 
Economy
1993 41% 46% 47% 58% 42%
1994 48% 53% 53% 63% 49%
1995 49% 48% 48% 72% 44%
1996 56% 55% 52% 76% 51%
1997 63% 60% 55% 77% 58%
1998 70% 66% 61% 86% 63%
1999 71% 70% 56% 87% 63%
2000 78% 67% 57% 92% 66%
2001 76% 66% 58% 86% 66%
2002 67% 59% 53% 83% 59%
2003 59% 54% 44% 76% 53%
                                      CEO
 
 
Top Five Executives 





1993 37% 41% 34% 50% 36%
1994 42% 45% 43% 57% 41%
1995 42% 42% 40% 62% 38%
1996 50% 49% 46% 69% 45%
1997 57% 54% 49% 72% 52%
1998 63% 58% 52% 80% 55%
1999 65% 63% 50% 82% 58%
2000 72% 63% 50% 87% 60%
2001 72% 60% 52% 83% 63%
2002 62% 54% 48% 77% 54%
2003 55% 51% 41% 69% 50%  
With both total compensation levels and the fraction of equity-based compensation going 
up during the examined period, the levels of equity-based compensation clearly had to go up 
during this period. But the question remains whether cash-based compensation levels went up or 
down. The increase in total compensation could have come wholly from the increase in equity- 12
based compensation, and cash compensation could have remained stable or even declined to 
“substitute” for the increased equity-based pay.  
Figure 3 depicts the relative increase in the value of both components of compensation 
during the considered period. As the figure shows, not only equity-based compensation levels 
increased during this period, roughly tripling between 1993 and 2003, but cash compensation 
also increased by almost 40% between 1993 and 2003. Thus, we do not discern a clear 
substitution effect of reductions in cash compensation accompanying the increase in equity-
based compensation. 
To examine this issue more systematically, we ran regressions for both the equity portion and 
the non-equity portion of the compensation, using the fixed-effect regression specified in 
equation (1). The coefficients of the yearly dummy variables in these regressions capture the 
changes over time in compensation, in isolation from changes in firm attributes.  
The results of the equity-based compensation, shown in Table 5 below, suggest that, 
controlling for changes in firm size and performance and using firm fixed effects (i.e., looking at 
the same firms), equity-based compensation increased during the period under consideration. 
With respect to both top-five compensation and CEO compensation, the coefficients of the 
yearly dummy variables in the equity-based compensation increase monotonically from 1993 to 
2001 and then decrease but remain much higher than in the beginning of the period. The 2003 
coefficients indicate that, controlling for changes in firm size and performance, log of equity-
based compensation increased by 1.347 for the CEO and by 1.468 for the top-five executives. 
  13
FIGURE 3: RELATIVE INCREASE IN EQUITY-BASED  
AND NON-EQUITY BASED CEO COMPENSATION 
 
Notes:  The figure displays the changes in CEO equity-based compensation and cash compensation in firms that 
belong to the S&P500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 indices. 
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TABLE 5: EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION 
FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSION 
The sample includes all S&P 1500 firms from the Execucomp database. ROA is the income before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization in year t-1, divided by the book value of asset in year t-1. Firm return is the market 
return of the firm’s stock. All figures used were adjusted to inflation and stated in 2002 dollars.  Standard errors 
appear below the coefficient estimate, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
  Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
  Log(CEO equity-based compensation)Log(Top 5 equity-based compensation)
                
Log(Sales (t-1))  0.305***    0.407 *** 
  (0.055)   (0.054)  
Log(1+Firm ROA(t-1))  0.672***    0.316 *** 
  (0.250)   (0.044)  
Log(1+Firm return (t-1))  0.324***    0.298 *** 
  (0.047)   (0.045)  
Log(1+Firm return (t-2))  0.308***    0.663 *** 
  (0.047)   (0.258)  
1994 0.428***    0.497  *** 
  (0.090)   (0.085)  
1995 0.440***    0.576  *** 
  (0.091)   (0.086)  
1996 0.799***    0.925  *** 
  (0.093)   (0.088)  
1997 0.929***    1.066  *** 
  (0.094)   (0.088)  
1998 1.256***    1.300  *** 
  (0.096)   (0.090)  
1999 1.494***    1.543  *** 
  (0.097)   (0.091)  
2000 1.694***    1.807  *** 
  (0.100)   (0.093)  
2001 1.698***    1.715  *** 
  (0.102)   (0.095)  
2002 1.489***    1.547  *** 
  (0.103)   (0.096)  
2003 1.346***    1.468  *** 
   (0.107)      (0.099)   
Observations 15421    14154   
Adjusted R
2 29%    35%   
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Again, we can translate the increase in log compensation to increase in compensation by 
taking the exponent of the estimated coefficients. Figure 4 plots the increases in compensation 
associated with this transformation. Figure 4 shows that, controlling for firm size and 
performance, the levels of CEO equity compensation increased by 285% between 1993 and 
2003, and the levels of equity-based compensation given to top-five executives increased by 
334%. The level of equity-based compensation for a firm with given size and performance 
peaked in 2000 and declined in the last three years of the examined period.  
 
FIGURE 4:  INCREASE IN EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION AFTER 
CONTROLLING FOR SIZE, PERFORMANCE AND FIXED EFFECTS 
The figure displays the changes in equity-based compensation to CEOs and top-five executives among firms that 
belong to the Execucomp database, after controlling for size, performance and fixed-effects. The year 1993 is the 
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   The results of the fixed-effect regression for the non-equity based compensation are 
displayed in Table 6. The coefficients of the yearly dummies increase not only between 1993 and 
2000 but also between 2000 and 2003. These coefficients indicate that the log of CEO cash 
compensation increased during 1993-2003 by 0.45 more than could be accounted for by changes 
in size and performance, and that the log of cash compensation paid to top-five executives 
increased by 0.37 beyond what could be accounted for by such changes.  
After translating increases in log compensation to increases in actual compensation, we 
present in Figure 5 the increases in cash-based compensation during the considered period 
controlling for firm size and performance. Figure 5 shows that, holding firm attributes constant, 
the levels of CEO cash-based compensation increased by 56% between 1993 and 2003, and the 
levels of the cash-based compensation paid to top-five executives increased by 45% during this 
period. Thus, we do not find evidence that increases in equity-based compensation were 
accompanied by companies’ reduction in cash-based compensation. Finally, it is worth noting 
that, while equity-based compensation peaked in 2000 and declined afterwards, cash-based 
compensation trended upwards throughout the examined period, and its growth pace even picked 
up after 2000.  17
TABLE 6: NON EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION 
FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSION 
 
The sample includes all S&P 1500 firms from the Execucomp database. ROA is the income before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization in year t-1, divided by the book value of asset in year t-1. Firm return is the market 
return of the firm’s stock. All figures used were adjusted for inflation by translation to 2002 dollars.  Standard errors 
appear below the coefficient estimate, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
 
 






                    
Log(Sales (t-1))  0.214***      0.230***   
  (0.014)     (0.012)  
Log(1+Firm ROA)  0.211***      0.206***   
  (0.062)     (0.010)  
Log(1+Firm return (t-1))  0.228***      0.138***   
  (0.012)     (0.010)  
Log(1+Firm return (t-2))  0.155***      0.190***   
  (0.012)     (0.059)  
1994 0.155***      0.143***   
  (0.022)     (0.020)  
1995 0.217***      0.206***   
  (0.022)     (0.020)  
1996 0.311***      0.287***   
  (0.023)     (0.020)  
1997 0.430***      0.386***   
  (0.023)     (0.020)  
1998 0.502***      0.446***   
  (0.024)     (0.021)  
1999 0.627***      0.573***   
  (0.024)     (0.021)  
2000 0.758***      0.685***   
  (0.025)     (0.021)  
2001 0.716***      0.626***   
  (0.025)     (0.022)  
2002 0.662***      0.577***   
  (0.026)     (0.022)  
2003 0.675***      0.583***   
   (0.026)        (0.023)    
Observations 15421      14154   
Adjusted R
2 66%      71%   
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FIGURE 5: INCREASAE IN NON-EQUITY COMPENSATION AFTER CONTROLLING 
FOR SIZE, PERFORMANCE AND FIXED EFFECTS 
The figure displays the changes in non equity-based compensation to CEOs and top five executives among firms 
that belong to the Execucomp database, after controlling for size, performance and fixed-effects. The year 1993 is 

















   
 
 
IV. THE INCREASE IN THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EXECUTIVE PAY 
 
In this section, we turn to examine the growing economic significance of executive pay 
during the period under consideration. We examine the changes during this period in the 
aggregate top-five compensation paid by public firms both in absolute terms and relative to 
aggregate earnings.  
Table 7 displays figures regarding aggregate executive compensation during the 
examined period. We start by adding up the compensation of the five most highly paid 
executives of all the firms in the ExecuComp database, excluding only the small number of firms 
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CEO
Top five 19
funds, and other investment funds (SIC codes 67xx).
2 When a firm has information about fewer 
executives than five, we added up the compensation given to the executives whose compensation 
was disclosed, and we use this sum (which is by definition lower than the top-five compensation 
in these firms) as the top-five compensation. As the first column of Table 7 indicates, the 
aggregate compensation paid to top-five executives of ExecuComp firms was about $212 billion 
in the period under consideration. (As before, all dollar figures in this section are in 2002 
dollars.) During the last five years, 1999-2003, aggregate compensation was about $122 billion, 
whereas during the last five years, 1993-1997, aggregate compensation was about $68 billion. 
Much of the recent research on executive compensation has been based on the 
ExecuComp database used above (see, e.g., Core, Guay and Larcker (2003), Murphy (1999)). 
However, because pay does not grow proportionately with size, small firms are likely to pay a 
larger fraction of total executive pay in the economy than is suggested by their fraction of total 
stock market capitalization. Therefore, in any assessment of the economic significance of such 
pay, it is important to take into account the large number of mid-cap and small-cap firms outside 
the ExecuComp database.  
We estimate aggregate compensation for COMPUSTAT firms, which provide data about 
most of the exchange-traded firms in the US, but are not included in ExecuComp. We exclude 
firms for which there are no income figures as well as real estate investment trusts, mutual funds, 
and other investment funds (SIC codes 67xx). We also exclude all firms with market 
capitalization below $50 million because ExecuComp, which provides the basis for our 
estimation of compensation in non-ExecuComp firms, includes very few firms with market cap 
below $50 million. After excluding all these firms, we remain with about 2500-3500 non-
ExecuComp firms in each year.  
We estimate the levels of top-five compensation by non-ExecuComp firms in the 
following way. For every year in our sample, we first estimate the coefficients of regression (2) 
for small-cap and mid-cap firms in the ExecuComp database.
3 This regression explains more 
than 50% of the variation in compensation among such firms in the ExecuComp database. We 
then use the estimated coefficients to predict the compensation levels for firms in our set of non-
                                                 
2 In such companies, management is largely done by an outside management entity and the management 
costs come in the form of the fees paid to these entity.    
3 To be able to include firms that exist less than 3 years in our database, we do not include in regression 
(2) the standard deviation and the 2-year lagged return variables. Adding these variables does not 
significantly change our results.  20
ExecuComp firms. For the firms for which we do not have data in Compustat that enables us to 
make such a prediction we use a procedure that is less demanding in terms of data needs: we first 
estimate the coefficients of a regression of log(compensation) on log(market cap) and industry 
dummies on all small-cap and mid-cap firms in the ExecuComp database and then we use the 
obtained coefficients to predict compensation for non-ExecuComp firms whose compensation 
we could not predict using the first procedure.
 4 
To verify that our methodology does not produce an over-estimate of aggregate 
compensation levels for firms outside the ExecuComp database, we compared the results from 
our estimation method with actual compensation figures that we obtained for about 750 firms 
outside the ExecuComp database.
5 We found that our estimate of the aggregate top-five 
compensation in these firms was about 20% lower than their actual aggregate compensation. 
Table 7, column 2 displays our estimates of aggregate top-five compensation in the firms in our 
set of non-ExecuComp firms. Although the aggregate market capitalization of these firms was 
less than one quarter of the market capitalization of ExecuComp firms throughout the examined 
period, the aggregate top-five compensation among these firms is about two-thirds of the 
aggregate compensation among ExecuComp firms.  
Column 3 of Table 7 displays the aggregate top-five compensation for all the 
ExecuComp firms for which we have actual compensation figures as well as all the non-
ExecuComp firms whose top-five compensation we estimated. We estimate that the aggregate 
compensation of all these firms was about $351 billion during the eleven-year period of 1993-
2003, with about $192 billion of this amount paid during the five-year period 1999-2003.  
 
                                                 
4 Because the non-ExecuComp firms whose compensation we seek to estimate would fall within the 
small-cap and mid-cap categories if they were included in ExecuComp, we base these estimates on 
regressions that are first run on all the small-cap and mid-cap firms in ExecuComp but not the S&P 500 
companies. We also repeated the procedure described in this paragraph using the coefficients of 
regression on all ExecuComp firms and obtained a larger estimate of aggregate compensation than the 
one produced by the procedure we follow. 
5 We are grateful to the shareholder advisory firm Glass, Lewis & Co. for providing us with this data.  21
TABLE 7: AGGREGATE TOP-FIVE COMPENSATION 1993-2003 (in $Billions) 
 
The table shows aggregate compensation paid by a large set of pubic firms to their top-five executives. The set of 
firms includes all ExecuComp firms and Compustat firms with market cap larger than $50 million except for firms 
for which there is no net income information in COMPUSTAT as well as real estate investment trusts, mutual funds, 
and other investment funds (SIC codes 67xx). All figures are in 2002 dollars. For ExecuComp firms, when a firm 
has information about fewer executives than five in the ExecuComp database, we added up the compensation given 
to the executives whose compensation was disclosed, and we use this sum as the top-five compensation. The 
compensation to non-ExecuComp firms is estimated using the coefficients of the following annual regressions on all 
small-cap and mid-cap firms in ExecuComp:  
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As to Compustat firms for which some of the data needed for this estimation is missing, their top-five compensation 
was estimated using the coefficients of annual regressions of Log(compensation) on Log(market cap), industry 
dummies, and new-economy dummy, run on all small-cap and mid-cap companies in ExecuComp.  
 
Period All ExecuComp Firms Non-ExecuComp firms All firms
       Full period: 1993-2003 212 139 351
First five years: 1993-1997 68 55 123
Last five years: 1999-2003 122 70 192
 
 
To assess the significance of executive pay, we also compared our estimate of the 
aggregate top-five compensation paid by our ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms to the 
aggregate earnings (net income) of these firms. Table 8 displays the results of our calculations. 
As the last row of this table indicates, we estimate that the aggregate top-five compensation of 
public firms during 1993-2003 comprised about 6.6% of the aggregate earnings of these firms.  
We also examined changes in the ratio of aggregate executive compensation to aggregate 
earnings during the examined period. Table 8 displays the evolution during this period of the 
ratio of aggregate top-five compensation to the aggregate earnings of public firms. We find that 
the ratio has been trending upwards, increasing from 5% during 1993-1995 to 9.8% during 2001-
2003.  
  22
TABLE 8: COMPENSATION AND CORPORATE EARNINGS 
The table shows the ratio of the sum of compensation to top-five executives paid by a large set of pubic firms to 
their aggregate earnings (net income). The set of firms includes all ExecuComp firms and Compustat firms with 
market cap larger than $50 except for firms for which there is no income information in Compustat as well as real 
estate investment trusts, mutual funds, and other investment funds. Income information is obtained from Compustat, 




 to aggreagate earnings









  Five-year periods: 1993-1997 5.2%
1999-2003 8.1%





V. EXPLAINING THE GROWTH OF PAY 
 
  We now turn to discussing possible explanations for the growth of executive pay. In 
discussing possible explanations, it is useful to distinguish between two models of the pay setting 
process: the arm’s-length bargaining model and the managerial power model (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003, 2004). These two models use different premises concerning the incentives of 
directors setting pay arrangements. Under the arm’s-length bargaining model, which is the focus 
of subsection A, boards making pay arrangements with executives are assumed to focus on the 
interests of shareholders. In contrast, under the managerial power view, which is the focus of 
subsection B, directors have incentives and inclinations to favor executives within the constraints 
imposed on them by market forces and outsiders’ reactions.  
  Because the growth of pay levels during the considered period paralleled the growth of 
stock market capitalization levels, and because compensation levels also grew in tandem with the 
levels of stock market capitalization in the preceding two decades (Frydman and Saks (2004), 
Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004)), it is natural to consider what could explain this connection.  23
As discussed below, both the arm's-length bargaining model and the managerial power model 
provide reasons for expecting such a correlation between compensation and market 
capitalization. Both models also suggest reasons for why the increased acceptability and use of 
option-based pay could have contributed to the rise in compensation levels. Finally, both models 
suggest that it is worthwhile to pay some attention to changes in the structure of the market for 
executives and governance arrangements during the considered period.  
  Although we conclude that some of the factors we discuss below are less likely than 
others to play a substantial role in explaining the growth of executive pay, the available evidence 
does not enable us to identify the exact contribution of the various factors we discuss. Our 
analysis, however, provides a framework for future study of this issue. 
  
A. The Arm’s-Length Bargaining Perspective 
 
1. The Effect of the Bull Market on the Supply and Demand of Executives  
 
  Under the arm’s-length bargaining model, compensation arrangements are the product of 
arm’s-length transacting between executives selling managerial services and directors seeking to 
get the best deal for their shareholders. In such a market, the price can go up if (i) the value to 
companies of executives’ services goes up (demand side), (ii) executives’ reservation value 
(resulting in part from executives’ outside options) goes up (supply side), or (iii) the job nature 
or requirements become more demanding or costly for executives.  
Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) and Hubbard (2005) suggest that, during a period of 
market booms, the demand for executives goes up and firms need to pay more in order to retain 
and hire executives. In the second half of the 1990's, it might be argued, executives of public 
companies were also attracted to opportunities in new technology start-ups, which added to the 
imbalance between supply and demand. In support of this argument, one could note the increase 
over time of the difference between pay to the executives of new economy firms (who could be 
the subject of especially intense demand) and to the executives of other companies. It is unclear, 
however, why demand-supply imbalances produced by booms should create permanent rather 
than transitory increases in pay levels. That would be the case only if the supply of executives 
cannot over time respond to the increased demand for them.  24
Another explanation that is based on the bull market was suggested recently by Spatt 
(2004). He suggests that the bull market increased the wealth of executives, which in turn 
increased their reservation wage by increasing the monetary amount needed to induce executives 
to work. This explanation assumes that the major choice of executives is between working and 
consuming leisure. This explanation might fit better to CEOs who are older, and perhaps less to 
younger CEOs with a lot of money. Thus, a prediction associated with this argument worthwhile 
checking is that, all else equal, the increase should be higher for older executives than to younger 
executives.  
Another market equilibrium explanation related to the bull market is that during booms 
executives need to exert more effort and increased pay levels are needed to compensate them for 
the disutility involved in higher effort levels. It is not evident, however, that stock market booms 
require more effort on the part of executives. One could argue that bear market periods, when 
funding is more difficult to get and shareholders are less happy, require greater effort by 
managers and impose greater disutility on them. 
 
2.  Changes in Executive Mobility, Turnover, and Liability 
 
Another market equilibrium explanation is based on the increased mobility of executives. 
During the past decade, hiring of CEOs from outside the firm has increased. It might be argued 
that, with more outside options, executives’ bargaining positions have strengthened. However, 
the net effect that board willingness to shop outside the firm has on executives’ bargaining 
positions is ambiguous. While firms’ willingness to shop for top outside executives has increased 
the number of options executives have, it has similarly increased the number of options firms 
have, and the latter effect could operate to strengthen directors’ bargaining positions.  
Another aspect of the market for executives that has changed is the somewhat increased 
incidence of executive firing. It might be suggested that compensation levels had to go up to 
compensate executives for the higher risk of being fired, and Hermalin (2004), Inderset and 
Mueller (2005), and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) link the increase in CEO pay to the increase in 
CEO turnover. However, even though the incidence of executive firing increased a bit, the risk of 
being fired remained quite small, hardly one that needs to be made up by a sharp increase in pay. 
Moreover, the financial cost of being fired has been reduced by the common contractual 
provisions that practically guarantee large severance payments to fired executives and by the  25
tendency of boards to accompany such contractual severance benefits with additional gratuitous 
goodbye payments (Bebchuk and Fried, chapters 7 and 11).
6 
  
3. Increases in Value of Outside Options  
 
We have thus far discussed explanations that focus on the market for executives of public 
firms. Another type of market equilibrium explanation might focus on developments in other 
markets. In particular, during the examined period, the rewards in other types of positions to 
which executives of public companies could have switched might have increased, and such 
increases might have required public companies to increase executive pay to retain their 
executives. Exploring this issue fully is beyond the scope of this article, but a look at the data 
available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that compensation given to other high-
level professionals increased at a significantly lower rate than executive compensation during the 
examined period.
7  
  It might also be suggested that public companies had to increase executive pay during the 
examined period in order to prevent managers from switching to closely held start-ups. Although 
such an option might have been available for some of the executives of public companies in the 
technology and new-economy areas, it is far from clear that it was readily available to most 
executives of other public firms. Moreover, this option was no longer particularly attractive after 
the burst of the bubble, and this explanation thus cannot explain why compensation remained at 
levels so much higher than in the beginning of the examined period.  
 
                                                 
6 Another cost-based explanation for why pay in recent years has not come back to the pre bull market 
levels is that after the corporate scandals, liability costs of managers have increased. However, the threat 
of personal legal liability remains quite limited for corporate managers (Black, Cheffins and Klausner 
(2004)). For one thing, officers and directors are often covered by insurance, and plaintiff lawyers have 
powerful incentives to settle their cases within the coverage provided by insurance. Accordingly, it is far 
from clear that the expected liability of managers require significant increases in compensation.  
7 For example, the compensation to high-level lawyers increased during the period 1993-2003 by 15%, 
the compensation to high-level engineers increased by 18%, and compensation to high-level accountants 
increased by 3% (all figures are net of inflation).   26
4. Increased Option Use: The Loosening of Populist Constraints 
 
 
  Some prominent economists viewed compensation levels in the beginning of the 
1990’s—or at least the levels of equity-based compensation—as too low (Jensen and Murphy 
(1990a, 1990b)). In their view, shareholders would have been better off if equity-based 
compensation increased to provide high-powered incentives. Political and populist constraints 
discouraged boards from raising equity-based compensation to levels that could produce high 
payoffs in the event of success. Starting from this view, one could argue that the growing 
acceptance of incentive-based compensation among institutional investors has loosened the 
political constraints that kept equity-based compensation at an inefficiently low level in the 
beginning of the 1990's. Thus, it might be argued, the growing levels of compensation were a 
product of the ability of boards to serve shareholders better.  
The movement in the direction of equity-based compensation is consistent with this 
argument. However, this explanation cannot account for the other ways in which pay has been 
changing during the considered period. In particular, the fact that cash compensation also 
increased during the period suggests that directors did not use equity-based compensation as a 
substitute for performance-insensitive cash compensation. Furthermore, it seems that equity-
based compensation has not been designed in the most cost-effective way to provide a given 
level of incentives. Had boards used indexing or other means of reducing the windfalls involved 
in conventional options, avoided re-pricing, back-door re-pricing and reloading and limited 
executives’ broad freedom to unload equity incentives, they would have been able to provide the 
same or better incentives at lower levels of equity-based compensation (Bebchuk and Fried, 
Chapters 11-14).  
 
5. Increased Option Use and Director Misperceptions  
 
The arm’s-length bargaining model assumes that directors seek to serve shareholders 
well—not that they necessarily succeed in doing so. This model is thus consistent with failure by 
boards to serve shareholders due to honest misperceptions and human errors. Murphy (2002) and 
Hall and Murphy (2003) argue that the large use of options in the considered period, which 
accounts for much of the increase in compensation levels during this period, is due to directors’ 
misperceiving the true costs to shareholders of option-based compensation.  27
  Under Hall and Murphy’s “perceived costs” hypothesis, boards have used conventional 
stock option plans because they failed to perceive the true economic cost to shareholders of such 
options. Because boards were able to grant such options without any cash outlay and without an 
accounting charge, Hall and Murphy suggest, boards perceived them as inexpensive if not free 
and therefore were overly willing to grant them.  
This explanation raises several questions. First, it implies that members of compensation 
committees—most of whom are current or former executives or other individuals with business 
sophistication—have systematically failed to recognize that options are costly to shareholders. 
This explanation also raises the question of why compensation consultants, assuming they have 
not been under the influence of executives, have not educated boards about the costs of options. 
Furthermore, one could expect boards to become over time better aware of the costs of options to 
shareholders. However, despite substantial public discussion of the costs of options to 
shareholders, the growth in option use and compensation levels has continued throughout the 
examined period.  
 
B. The Managerial Power Perspective  
  
The managerial power perspective does not assume that directors seek to get the best deal 
for shareholders. Rather, directors are willing to go along with compensation arrangements more 
favorable to executives. How far executives and directors will stray from shareholder interests 
will depend on the market penalties and social costs that they will have to bear when adopting 
arrangements favorable to executives. Both market penalties and social cost depend on how such 
arrangements are perceived by relevant outsiders. Under the managerial power model, changes in 
compensation levels can be expected when the constraints that executives and directors face 
change.  
   
1. The Bull Market and the Outrage Constraint  
 
  Bebchuk and Fried (2004, chapter 5) argue that the stock market boom has increased the 
pay levels that are defensible and acceptable to outsiders without triggering significant outrage. 
Under this view, a rising stock market, which affects even the market caps of poorly performing 
companies, provides most firms with a convenient justification for substantial pay increases.  28
Furthermore, investors and other outsiders are generally less bothered by excessive and distorted 
pay arrangements when markets are rising rapidly.  
According to this explanation, the bull market of the 1990's—the biggest bull market 
since the Depression—weakened the outrage constraint, giving managers and boards more 
latitude to boost executive pay. Conversely, shareholders who have seen the value of their 
investments decline precipitously are more prone to scrutinize managerial behavior and less 
likely to be forgiving of what they perceive (correctly or incorrectly) to be managerial 
overreaching, which is consistent with the fact that pay did not continue to escalate during 2000-
2002.  
Like the market equilibrium explanations discussed above, this explanation predicts a 
general correlation over time between stock market levels and compensation levels. How one can 
disentangle which explanation underlies this correlation is an interesting question for future 
research. 
 
2. The Bull Market and the Market for Corporate Control  
 
  A related explanation is that increases in market cap levels bring about an increase in the 
absolute amounts that executives can extract without triggering a control contest. Suppose that 
the market value of a firm can fall by a fixed percentage from its “full” value without triggering 
takeover bids. In such a case, the amount of private benefits that executives can extract will go 
up proportionately with increases in market capitalization.  
A problem with this explanation, however, is that it assumes that the market for corporate 
control is the binding constraint on executive pay. Instead, however, because of the costs of 
takeovers and management’s power to use defensive tactics, the corporate control market does 
not appear to be the binding constraint. Compensation levels appear to fall substantially below 
the level that would be sufficient to trigger a hostile bid.   
 
  3. Increased Use of Equity-Based Compensation and the Outrage Constraint 
 
In the early 1990's, institutional investors and federal regulators, with the support of 
financial economists, embraced the idea that performance-based compensation can serve 
shareholders by improving incentives. Bebchuk and Fried (2004, chapter 5) argue that outsiders’  29
enthusiasm for incentive-based compensation provided executives and directors with 
opportunities to raise pay levels substantially in ways that would appear acceptable to outsiders.  
Under this explanation, executives were able to take advantage of investors’ enthusiasm 
for incentive-based compensation in several ways. First, they were able to obtain substantial 
additional option pay without having to bear a corresponding downward adjustment in cash 
compensation. Furthermore, executives used their influence to make the design of option plans 
advantageous to them. The use of conventional options, broad freedom to unload equity 
incentives and back-door repricing increased the amount and reduced the performance-sensitivity 
of option-based compensation, enabling executives to obtain much larger amounts of 
compensation than more cost-effective option plans would have provided. 
  In addition, because option compensation offers the possibility of improved incentives, 
the use of options made more defensible very large compensation amounts that would have 
triggered prohibitive outrage had they been solely in cash. While Apple CEO Steve Jobs was 
able to obtain an option package worth more than half a billion dollars, cash compensation of 
this magnitude is still inconceivable. Firms could have used better-designed option plans that 
would have provided the same incentives for significantly less cost. However, the large windfall 
elements of the option plans that firms did use were not sufficiently clear and transparent to 
make these plans blatantly unjustifiable. Thus, under this explanation, managers were able to get 
substantial increases in pay levels by using shareholders’ interest in increasing the performance-
sensitivity of pay and the fact that option pay is easier to defend and legitimize even when the 
pay is based on flawed schemes.  
  This explanation could be questioned by asking why risk-averse managers would not use 
their influence to get higher cash salaries rather than more options. A response might be that 
managers seeking to increase their pay during the 1990's did not have a choice between 
additional option compensation and additional cash compensation with the same expected value. 
Instead, outsiders’ enthusiasm for equity-based compensation created an opportunity for 
managers to obtain additional option compensation without offsetting reductions in their cash 
compensation. 
 
4. Changes in Entrenchment Levels   
 
To the extent that the market for corporate control is a meaningful constraint on 
executives and directors, it might be suggested that this constraint weakened since the early  30
1990's. The adoption of state antitakeover statutes, the development of Delaware law permitting 
managers to use the “just say no” defense, and the adoption of firm-level antitakeover 
arrangements provided managers with more protection from hostile takeovers at the end of the 
considered period than the beginning (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004)). Executives and 
directors might have used the greater protection from takeovers to raise pay levels. 
In addition, managers’ greater ability to block acquisitions has been used as a justification 
for, and has made acceptable to shareholders, the use of golden parachutes and other 
arrangements that provide managers with large payments in the event of an acquisition. During 
the considered period, the incidence of firms with golden parachute arrangements increased 
considerably (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004)). This practice could also have contributed to 
the increase in compensation levels during this period. 
In contrast to this explanation, Hall and Murphy (2003) rely on changes in governance 
arrangements during the considered period to argue that the managerial power model is 
inconsistent with the growth of pay during this period. In particular, they rely on the fact that the 
incidence of independent directors increased during the considered period.
8 Assuming that 
increased use of independent directors reduces managerial power, Hall and Murphy suggest, the 
managerial power model should have predicted declines in pay rather than pay increases during 
the considered period. However, Bebchuk and Fried (2004, chapter 2) argue independent 
directors have been quite willing to go along with pay arrangements favorable to executives. In 
this view, the increased incidence of independent directors has been a less important 





  This paper has considered the growth of executive compensation during 1993-2003. 
During this period, compensation increased considerably. The analysis indicates that the growth 
in pay levels has gone far beyond what could be explained by the changes in market cap and 
industry mix during the examined period. The growth of pay involved a substantial rise in the 
compensation paid to the executives of firms of a given market cap and industry classification. 
                                                 
8 For a study of the growing incidence of independent directors, see Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2004).   31
Although equity-based compensation has grown the most, its growth has not been accompanied 
by a reduction in cash compensation  
The analysis has also highlighted the economic significance of the changes in 
compensation levels. The compensation that public companies paid to their top-five executives 
during the period 1993-2003 added up to about $350 billion, and the ratio of this aggregate top-
five compensation to the aggregate earnings of these firms increased from 5% in 1993-1995 to 
about 10% in 2001-2003. Thus, the potential costs of flawed compensation arrangements—if 
such flaws exist—could be quite meaningful for investors. 
  This paper has also examined alternative accounts of the causes for the growth in pay. 
Both the arm’s-length model and the managerial power model of executive compensation 
provide insight into factors that could have contributed to the escalation of pay. The escalation of 
pay that we document cannot by itself resolve the debate concerning the extent to which 
managerial influence shapes the market for executive pay. The rise of pay, however, does 
increase the importance of this debate and the questions it raises. The stakes are large.    32
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